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Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, central bankers around the 
world have been forced to abandon conventional monetary policy tools 
in favor of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing, forward 
guidance, and even lowering the interest rate paid on bank reserves into 
negative territory. In particular, facing the zero-lower-bound on interest 
rates, central bankers in the United States and Europe have shifted from 
their usual instrument of monetary policy—a targeted uncollateralized 
interest rate paid on overnight interbank loans—to targeting a certain 
level of bank reserves.  
Japan was a pioneer of much of this unconventional monetary 
policy. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) first embarked on “forward guidance” 
(before the term was commonly used) in February of 1999 with its so-
called “zero-interest rate policy” (ZIRP), by which BoJ Governor Hayami 
committed to keep the uncollateralized overnight interbank rate, the call 
rate, at zero “until deflationary conditions subside.” The target call rate 
was raised to 25 basis points in August of 2000, but in retrospect, that 
rate raise seemed premature, and it was lowered again, this time to 15 
basis points, in February 2001. With the economy still not performing at 
potential and mired in deflation, at its March 2001 meeting the BoJ 
shifted its monetary policy instrument from the call rate to the amount 
of bank reserves held on deposit at the BoJ.  
Japan’s bold experiment in targeting bank reserves was the world’s 
first policy of quantitative easing (QE). Despite much controversy and 
debate, even among the monetary policy board members of the BoJ 
itself, this first round of quantitative easing, now referred to as “QE1,” 
remained in effect for nearly six years. Over that period, the targeted 
balance of the BoJ’s current account was raised several times. When the 
policy was first announced in March 2001, reserves were targeted at 5 
trillion yen. That was raised to 6 trillion yen in August 2001 and then to a 
range between 10–15 trillion in December of the same year. When 
Hayami was succeeded by Governor Fukui in 2003, QE1 was expanded 
further to reach a target of 30–35 trillion by January 2004. Finally, on 
March 9, 2006, the BoJ lifted the quantitative easing policy by a 7–1 vote, 
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citing that the three conditions for lifting QE, set out at the January 2004 
monetary policy meeting, had been met. The BoJ’s monetary policy 
instrument was switched from the BoJ current account balance back to 
the conventional instrument of the uncollateralized overnight call rate, 
although to assuage critics in the Ministry of Finance and Cabinet Office, 
the BoJ pledged that the targeted call rate would remain effectively at 
zero for some time: ZIRP would remain in place. Three months later, in 
July 2006, the BoJ made the historic decision to lift ZIRP and target a 25 
basis point call rate. Interest rates in Japan had finally been normalized 
after more than six years of experimental policy.  
At the end of Governor Fukui’s term in March, Masaaki Shirakawa 
took over at the helm of the BoJ. He was soon facing the global financial 
crisis, or the “Lehman Shock” as it is sometimes referred to in Japan. By 
December 2008, policy rates were nearly at zero in the United States. The 
BoJ lowered the target call rate from 30 to 10 basis points and announced 
an increase in outright purchases of Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) 
and some less conventional assets such as commercial paper. However, 
Governor Shirakawa insisted that this was not a return to QE. QE 
returned, however, in 2013, under Shirakawa’s successor, Kuroda, and 
was promoted as the first of three “arrows” in Prime Minister Abe’s 
economic plan, “Abenomics,” which he placed at the center of his 
political agenda.  
In April 2013, Governor Kuroda announced Qualitative and 
Quantitative Easing, or QQE. This was a pledge to end the “incremental” 
approach of the BoJ (presumably a dig at Shirakawa) by doubling the 
monetary base within one year and raising the average maturity of JGBs 
held by the BoJ. This was forecast to increase the size of the BoJ’s balance 
sheet by about 1% of GDP each month, double the rate that had been set 
by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (the Fed) under its program 
of “Large Scale Asset Purchases” (Fed Chair Ben Bernanke was, like 
Shirakawa, insistent that his policy was not QE). At the time of this 




What is the path of monetary policy transmission in the case of 
unconventional policies such as QE and QQE? One way QE is supposed to 
work is through the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission. The central bank creates new money—usually 
electronically—and uses it to purchase large amounts of assets from 
commercial bank. This makes the commercial banks more liquid, which 
should lead to lower interest rates on loans and stimulate borrowing by 
businesses and households. This borrowing, in turn, is used to finance 
new investment, which in turn stimulates economic growth and 
eventually inflation in the macroeconomy.  
A seminal article on the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission is Anil Kashyap and Jeremy Stein’s (2000) study, which 
found support for the existence of the bank lending channel in an analysis 
of quarterly balance sheet data on U.S. commercial banks from 1976 to 
1993. Kaoru Hosono (2006) builds on the model proposed by Kashyap 
and Stein (2000), extending their empirical analysis to include not only 
liquidity, but also bank capital, in an analysis of the transmission of 
Japanese monetary policy during the period 1975 to 1999. Echoing some 
of the findings of Kashyap and Stein (2000), Hosono (2006) finds evidence 
of a bank lending channel in Japan, and concludes that it works more 
effectively through smaller, less liquid, banks with higher capital ratios. 
In sub-sample analysis however, Hosono (2006) demonstrates that the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy 
transmission is asymmetric: during period of monetary tightening, bank 
liquidity plays an important role in transmission, while during periods of 
monetary policy tightening, bank capital becomes paramount.  
The study most closely related to our study, however, is that of 
David Bowman et al. (2015) which examines the impact of 
unconventional monetary policy in Japan. Bowman et al. (2015) 
empirically evaluate the effect of Japan’s first pioneering experiment 
with quantitative easing policy from 2001 to 2006 (QE1) on bank lending. 
They find a positive, statistically significant impact of bank liquidity on 
bank lending during the period of QE1 but conclude that it is so small as 
to be quantitatively, economically, rather insignificant.   
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. The next section 
discusses the data used in the analysis and the empirical methodology, 
after which the empirical results are presented and discussed. The final 
section concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
Data  
We use an unbalanced panel of data on 147 Japanese banks’ balance 
sheets and financial statements over the 15-year period between 2000 
and 2015 from the Japanese Bankers Association (JBA). The data 
frequency is semi-annual, as balance sheet and financial statement 
information is reported every September and March (note that Japan’s 
fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31). Thus, our panel of data includes 
a total of 4,003 bank-period observations. Table 1 reports the summary 
statistics. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics, 2000-2015 
Variable Name Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Loan Growth (log change, %) 0.85% 5.24 –103.73% 84.43% 
Liquidity Ratio (%) 6.64% 3.91 1.13% 54.85% 
Total Assets (log, million yen) 14.67 1.23 10.38 19.12 
Total Deposits (log, million yen)  14.45 1.38 4.01 18.70 
Equity Ratio (%)  5.04% 4.93 –78.82 79.83 
Bad Loan Ratio (%) 81.79 95.55 –612.47 1,916.83 
No. of Banks (i) 147 
No. of Time Periods (t) 30 
No. of Observations 4,003 





Our baseline estimation regresses the panel of data described 
above using the following reduced-form equation: 
∆ log%L',)*+, = β/ + β+LR',) + BX',) + ε',)*+                 (1) 
where: 
∆ log%L',)*+, represents log change of loans for bank i at time t + 1  
LR',) represents the liquidity ratio of bank i at time t, defined as the 
ratio of liquid assets (“cash and due from banks” plus “call loans”) divided 
by total assets 
X',) represents a vector of control variables, including the log of 
total assets, the log of total deposits, the equity ratio (the ratio of bank 
equity to total assets) and the bad loan ratio (the ratio of bad loans to 
total bank equity; bad loans are defined as the sum of “loan to borrowers 
in legal bankruptcy,” “past due loans in arrears by six months or more,” 
“loans in arrears by three months or more and less than six months” and 
“restructured loans”) for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
ε',)*+: represents the error term for bank i at time (t + 1) 
In equation 1, the main parameter of interest is β+, the coefficient 
on the liquidity ratio. If monetary policy is effective, the estimate of β+ 
will be positive and statistically significant, indicating that a higher bank 
liquidity ratio leads to higher bank loan growth.  
The empirical methodology used starts with a simple pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, then turns to balanced panel 
data analysis, exploring the effect of including both individual and time 
fixed effects. Finally, to address concerns about lagged dependent 






3. Empirical Results 
 
Table 2. The Effect of Higher Bank Liquidity Ratios on Loan Growth 
























Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant Term –0.00 
(0.01) 
    








































No. Obs. 2,580 2,460 2,460 4,003 2,172 
Note: Standard errors are written in parenthesis below the finding, and asterisks repre-
sent significant findings at the 10%*, 5%**, and 1%*** level, respectively. I=147 (or 133), 
T=30 (or 33), N=4,003 (or 2,460) 
 
The results reported in Table 2, which reports the results of 
empirical estimation of equation (1), indicate that monetary policy was 
effective during the period of our study. For nearly all empirical 
methodologies—pooled OLS, panel data with individual fixed effects or 
time fixed effects, and for GMM—the coefficient estimate of interest is 
positive and highly statistically significant at the 5% or even 1% level. This 
suggests that banks with relatively higher liquidity ratios in a given period 
tend to have statistically significantly higher loan growth in the following 
period. 
The size of the parameter estimate nearly doubles when individual 
bank fixed effects are accounted for in column (2), and when we address 
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the possibility of endogeneity due to a lagged dependent variable on the 
right-hand side through two-step system GMM analysis. 
 
3. Conclusions 
The empirical results presented above indicate that unconventional mon-
etary policy has significant effects through the bank lending channel, alt-
hough the impact on bank lending is quantitatively small. This raises 
questions as to the appropriateness of the policy implementation and the 
long-term implications of the policy for the banking sector and macroe-
conomy as a whole. In particular, further investigation is needed regard-
ing potential differences in the impact of QE across banking institutions 
and potential unintended side effects of QE. 
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